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Abstract 
In a linear bilateral monopoly  with the up-stream manufacturer and the down-
stream retailer “consumers’ friendly” socially concerned (i.e. caring about a 
share of consumer surplus), Brand and Grothe (2015, in this Journal) shows 
that, although (as expected) both firms’ owners do not have an incentive to 
deviate from pure profit maximization when they choose their level of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) simultaneously (or the retailer commits 
itself on social concern before the manufacturerer does), if the manufacturer 
commits itself on social concern before the retailer does, then both profits are 
enhanced. This paper shows that Brand and Grothe’s result may be strongly 
modified if there are decreasing returns to the input: only the retailer firm’s 
owners are incentived to adopt CSR and, at the equilibrium, this leads to a 
Pareto-superior outcome. This offers straightforward policy and empirical 
implications, arguing that the presence of CSR-type firms – which leads to 
higher profits and Pareto-superior outcomes, confirming the neoclassical 
economics point of view with respect to the adoption of CSR behaviors by 
firms’ owners – depends crucially  on the technology.  
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1. Introduction 
In the last decades, the adoption of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
activities has become a global business practice. In 2002, KPMG surveyed the 
top 100 companies in 45 countries, disclosing that 23 percent of them declared 
the accomplishment of CSR activities in their financial reports; those figures 
grew to 73 percent in 2015. Moreover, in the same time period, the Global 
Fortune Index (which includes the world’s 250 largest companies) has more 
than doubled those figures, from 45 to 92 percent (KPMG 2005, 2015). 
The booming expansion of CSR has raised questions among scholars and policy-
makers, exciting the debate on the motives pushing companies to engage in  
socially concerned activities, and this subject has been approached from 
different perspectives.1 
The rationale for firms owned and (directly or indirectly, through opportunely 
hired and instructed managers) managed by shareholders to embark in 
unprofitable social activities has so far remained an unanswered puzzle, unless 
one discards the first principle of the rationality of “homo oeconomicus”.  
In fact, focusing exclusively on the realm of economics, the first principles of 
economics states that corporations are only responsible to their shareholders2, 
and Milton Friedman (1970), in an article appeared in The New York Times with 
the evocative title “The social responsibility of business is to increase its 
profits”, openly declares that the only objective of  corporations is to maximize 
                                                          
1 For instance, Garriga and Mele` (2004) categorize the most significant CSR theories (and 
related approaches) with respect to the following aspects of social reality: economics, 
politics, social integration and ethics. 
2 With regard to the standpoint of economics, see also the discussion in Benabou and Tirole 
(2010). 
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their shareholders’ returns, provided that the legal framework and the ethical 
custom of the country in which the corporations operate are respected.  
Therefore, several empirical works have started investigating the correlation 
between CSR activities and profitability performances. On the whole, the 
results have been mixed or opposing, even within the same study. It follows 
that, at the current stage, there is a lack of an unambiguous, general 
consensus. A large majority of the scholars has identified either an exclusive 
negative (see, e.g. Bromiley and Marcus, 1989; Davidson et al. 1987; Davidson 
and Worrel, 1988) or a doubtful empirical evidence (e.g. Aupperle et al., 1985; 
Ingram and Frazier, 1983). However, a growing number of empirical works has 
revealed a positive link between the CSR and their financial performance (e.g. 
Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Roman et al., 1999; Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
Focusing on the relationship between performance and CSR in retailer firms, 
empirical evidence is provided by Schramm-Klein et al. (2015) who, through 
a survey among retailers and applying partial least squares structural 
equation modeling, argue that CSR generally has positive effects on retailer 
performance – despite the cost associated with CSR implementation.  
However, theoretical explanations of the widespread presence of CSR-type 
firms have been provided resorting to several standpoints, but substantially 
abstracting from the above mentioned puzzle. Though no general agreement 
exists about the precise definition of the term “corporate social responsibility”, 
two different viewpoints describe it: 1) a specific social activity firms conduct in 
voluntary way (i.e. beyond legal requirements), without inquiring neither the 
rationale for the occurring of this choice, nor the purely economic effects it 
induces; or 2) an explicit profit-sacrificing social activity (i.e. the damage caused 
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to the profits precisely defines the true CSR).3 It seems to be rather unexpected 
that, in the domain of economics, the firms’ extensive engagement in CSR 
activities either is not explained and it does not matter to explain it, or is clearly 
profit-damaging and the main interpretation is that precisely this damage truly 
identifies CSR. Therefore, taking seriously into consideration the point of view 
of economics, it is natural to inquire whether the introduction of CSR may 
contribute to improve the firms’ profitability, so also contributing to the 
solution of the puzzle. In this paper, we start from the basic model of 
duopolistic Cournot competition, in which it is easy to show that firms – which 
maximize short-run profits - always reduce their profits by introducing social 
concerns in their objectives, for instance, under the form of an “interest” for 
the welfare of consumers. 
Indeed, a typical feature shared by several articles is the assumption of CSR 
activities in terms of a maximization of an objective function which is a 
weighted sum of profit and consumer surplus, i.e. social responsibility takes the 
form of “consumers’ friendly” activities. However, among those contributions, 
a typical difference concerns whether and how such CSR activities are chosen: 
                                                          
3 Doni and Ricchiuti (2013, 382) describes in an enlightening way these definitions and their 
different implications: “There are two polar definitions that can appear in sharp contrast. 
According to a first point of view, a firm is socially responsible when it takes environment-
friendly actions not required by law. In this light, CSR can be defined without any regard 
neither to the motivation of the firm’s choices nor to the impact of such choices on the 
firm’s profit. From a different point of view, other authors believe that a firm is truly 
responsible only when it sacrifices its profit, at least in part, in order to carry out some social 
objective. Baron (2001) names the first behaviour as strategic CSR and the second one as 
altruistic CSR. This second concept of CSR is quite disputed: according to some authors an 
altruistic CSR is neither sustainable in a competitive market nor desirable from a social point 
of view (see Reinhardt et al., 2008, and literature quoted therein)”. 
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on the one hand, the levels of CSR may be exogenously given for both firms or 
only one firm chooses the level of CSR while other firms remain profit-seeking 
(e.g. Kopel, 2009; Kopel and Brand, 2012;  Goering  2007, 2009, 2012, 2014; 
Brand and Grothe, 2013; Lambertini and Tampieri 2012, 2015; Fanti and 
Buccella, 2017a,b; which focus on the effects of firms’ CSR on competition 
under various aspects such as the environmental outcomes4, entry game5 and 
managerial delegation6), and on the other hand, the CSR levels are 
endogenously chosen by profit-maximizing firms’ owners for strategic reasons 
in oligopolistic contexts (i.e., in a standard Cournot duopoly market), although 
few authors study the endogenous strategic choice of the CSR parameter (e.g. 
Hino and Zennyo, 2017; Planer-Friedrich and Sahm, 2016; Fanti and Buccella, 
                                                          
4 For instance, Lambertini and Tampieri (2015) assume, in addition to the care for the 
consumer surplus, an environmental externality and show that, with a sufficiently large 
market size, the CSR firm obtains higher profits than its profit-seeking competitors. 
Lambertini, Palestini, and Tampieri (2016) further show – although in a dynamic context with 
a linear state differential game and capacity accumulation – that, in the presence of 
environmental externalities, if the market is sufficiently large, the CSR firm sells more, 
accumulates more capital, and earns higher profits than its profit-seeking rival. 
5 Fanti and Buccella (2017a) show that when the market is adequately large, the adoption of 
CSR rules acts as an entry barrier in the industry because the incumbent may “penalize” the 
potential entrant’s profits when the former has social concern, and the larger the 
incumbent’s social concern is, the larger the “penalization” is. 
6 More precisely, Goering (2007) and Kopel and Brand (2012) analyze the strategic use of 
managerial incentives in a non-profit firm mixed duopoly, in which one of the firms is not 
profit maximizer while the rival is. On the other hand, Goering (2008) studies the same 
asymmetric structure without managers, in the presence of three firms in which the care of 
the overall social welfare represents the CSR feature of the non-profit firms. Kopel and 
Brand (2013), in line with their previous work, investigate the reason why a CSR-type firm 
pays low-powered incentives to their executives. 
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2017b Supplement, c).7 Hino and Zennyo (2017) analyze the endogenous 
decision-making as regards the level of CSR in a delegation game with Cournot–
Stackelberg competition. They show that the follower can derive a greater 
profit than the leader and achieve maximum profit when firms sequentially 
choose their CSR level. Planer-Friedrich and Sahm (2016) show that firms prefer 
to care for all consumers rather than for own customers only, choosing positive 
levels of CSR, but at the equilibrium choosing CSR reduce firms’ profits. 
However, independently of the strategic motivations for adopting CSR 
behaviors (while, however, as highlighted above, lead to lower profits at the 
market equilibrium), some recent papers have shown that the aim of 
maximizing profits can be a motive for the firm’s engagement in CSR, as the 
neoclassical economics point of view requires because the adoption of CSR may 
increase profits of all firms at the market equilibrium. Fanti and Buccella 
(2017b, Supplement) study the situation in which firms’ owners non-
cooperatively select their endogenous level of social concerns. Those authors 
find that, when goods are substitute,8 a unique sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium exists in which both firms engage in CSR, but this equilibrium is 
Pareto inefficient: a standard prisoner’s dilemma arises. Indeed, Fanti and 
Buccella (2017c), also introducing managerial delegation (i.e. owners delegate 
output decisions to a manager), show that in the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium both firms are CSR-type and, in addition, the presence of CSR 
                                                          
7  Siegel and Vitaliano (2007) and Fernández-Kranz and Santaló (2010) provide some 
empirical confirmations that firms’ social responsibility can be strategically chosen. 
8 On the other hand, when goods are complement, two pure-strategy asymmetric Nash 
equilibria emerge, that is, one firm engages in CSR activities while the rival remains profit-
seeking: the game becomes an anti-coordination game. 
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activities improves the firms’ profitability while harms the welfare of 
consumers and society, a result in contrast to the conventional wisdom under 
non-managerial firms.  Moreover, Fanti and Buccella (2017d) show that, when 
firms non-cooperatively compete on CSR in network industries, the classical 
conventional prisoner’s dilemma result in standard industries – i.e. to have 
social concerns is the Nash equilibrium but it is harmful for firms’ profits – 
vanishes and, for adequately strong network effects, the equilibrium in which 
both firms are engaged in CSR is more profitable than simple profit-seeking. 
When firms cooperatively choose the profit-maximising level of CSR - a profit-
maximising CSR level does exist provided that network effects are sufficiently 
strong.  
While all the aforementioned contributions deal with the standard Cournot 
duopoly, another branch of this literature studying the strategic content of the 
CSR choices focuses on a vertical structure of the industry and studies the 
impact of firms’ social concern on that. In particular, in a bilateral monopoly 
model, Goering (2012) and Brand and Grothe (2013) focus on a perfectly 
coordinated 9 supply chain channel: while the former assumes that either the 
manufacturer or the retailer can be socially concerned and finds that  CSR 
reduces a firm's profit, the latter authors extend the analysis to the case where 
both firms are socially concerned and show that the retailer does not have any 
incentive to be socially concerned, because all the actions are neutralized by 
the manufacturer through the two-part tariff. Goering (2014) assumes that the 
manufacturer – which is strictly profit-seeking - will select a two-part contract, 
                                                          
9 In such a case, the double marginalization - early investigated  by Spengler (1950) - is 
eliminated by construction through the assumption that the manufacturer absorbs the 
whole retailer’s profit with an optimal two-part tariff. 
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consisting of a wholesale price for the goods and level of CSR (which its retailer 
has to include  in its business activity) that maximizes its profits, showing that a 
CSR contract can be used in place of the two-part tariff scheme to coordinate 
optimally the marketing channel. Brand and Grothe (2015), unlike Goering 
(2012) and Brand and Grothe (2013), relax the assumption of perfect channel 
coordination and unlike Goering (2014), assume that both the manufacturer 
and the retailer maximize the socially responsible objectives. Those authors 
show that, when both firms simultaneously choose their level of social 
responsibility or the  retailer first commits on the social responsibility, both 
firms do not have an incentive to deviate from pure profit maximization, while 
if the choice of the manufacturer on social concerns is prior to that of the 
retailer then, at the equilibrium, both firms endogenously decide to follow CSR 
rules, and are better off. Finally, following Wirl (2015)10, a recent paper by Chen 
et al. (2016), still examining the influence of CSR strategy in vertically related 
markets, pays attention to the retailer's effort and different pricing rule under 
successive duopoly, assuming that downstream retailers do not directly 
concern over CSR, however they need to choose the optimal efforts to keep or 
even improve the sales quantity or quality of intermediate goods purchased 
from the upstream firms, while the upstream firms have CSR concerns, showing 
that such a concerns may reduce the total surplus of the four firms and the 
social welfare. 
In particular, the latter Brand and Grothe (2015)’s result is important because it 
shows that, in a vertical industry, the owners of both firms may choose to be 
                                                          
10 Wirl (2015) investigates whether is more profitable a wholesale or a retail pricing 
arrangement, but without considering the implications of CSR. 
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socially responsible simply because their profits increase (that is, without 
owners’ altruism or stakeholders’ pressures). However, Brand and Grothe 
(2015), as all the above-mentioned received literature, assume constant 
returns to input (i.e. a one-to-one relationship between input and output). 
Given the interest of the Brand and Grothe (2015)’s results for the issue of the 
firms’ motivation to engage in CSR as well as the specificity of its predictions 
(that is, CSR may emerge only if the manufacturer is Stackelberg-leader in the 
choice of the CSR levels and the weight given to the consumer surplus by the 
retailer is precisely one third and half of that given by the manufacturer), we 
question if the alteration of the assumption with regard to the technology in 
place in the supply chain may modify such results.  Therefore, in our 
framework, the constant return to input assumption is relaxed and substituted 
by a decreasing return to input, while the rest of the Brand and Grothe’s (2015) 
model is kept unaltered. In detail, we assume increasing marginal costs in line 
with the short-run context of any Cournot model: indeed, according to the first 
principles of economics, in the short-run some factors are fixed with remaining 
factors subject to diminishing returns, so that the short-run marginal cost is 
increasing in output. With regard to the labor costs, typical arguments for the 
existence of rising marginal costs are, for instance, the additional costs of 
overtime work and the higher cost of bringing into use older vintages of 
equipment to meet the additional demand.11  
The main findings of the paper are as follows. First, in a vertical industry (with 
decreasing returns to input), both firms’ owners may earn higher profits at the 
                                                          
11 Making use of  U.S. manufacturing data for 1957-1983, Bils (1987) shows that a short-run 
increase in production- worker employment of 10 percent was associated with a marginal 
cost rise of about 2.4 percent, mostly due to overtime payments because employment is not 
perfectly flexible. 
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equilibrium adopting CSR behavios. Second, only the downstream firm finds 
optimal  to be of CSR-type and strongly engaged towards the welfare of 
consumers, reversing the Brand and Grothe’s (2015) result; nonetheless, the 
profit-seeking manufacturer firm’s benefits from the consumers’ friendly CSR of 
its retailer, leading to a Pareto-superior outcome.  
In the next Section, we introduce the basic ingredients of the model with 
unions and the cooperative choice of CSR activities. Then, for comparative 
purposes, Section 3 presents the equilibrium outcomes of the model without 
CSR. Section 4 compares the outcomes of the models without and with firms 
endogenously socially concerned and derives the main results. The last Section 
sums up our findings, offering some policy and empirical insights. 
 
2. The model 
We develop a standard linear bilateral monopoly framework, where p is the 
market price for the final product and q is the final product’s quantity. The 
manufacturer (M) sells its quantity m at the wholesale price c to the retailer (R) 
before the retailer sells the products to the consumer. We assume a decreasing 
returns to scale production function in the input:  
mq             (1) 
 
where m is the input retailer employs.  We denote v the constant marginal cost 
of production in the manufacturer firm. In addition to the manufactured input 
cost, the retailer has to face a constant marginal (e.g. labour) cost, w. 
Given the outlined assumptions, the monopolist manufacturer’s profit function 
is: 
11 
 
2)()( qvcmvcM  .           (2) 
 
The monopolist retailer firm faces the following linear inverse demand 
function: 
qap  .           (3)  
 
The monopolist retailer’s profit function is: 
qcqwqacmqwpR )()(  .        (4) 
 
In line with the recent established literature (e.g. Goering 2007, 2008, 2012; 
Lambertini and Tampieri, 2015, Brand and Grothe, 2015), the model considers 
that social concerns can be interpreted as taking care of the welfare of 
consumers (consumers’ friendliness). Therefore, the characteristic of a CSR firm 
is to be responsive to the consumer surplus, which is, as known,  
2
2q
CS  .         (5) 
  
As a consequence, each “consumers’ friendly” firm is supposed, in its objective, 
to maximize its profits plus a fraction of the consumer surplus, which 
represents the firm’s ‘‘social concern’’ or care for consumers. Thus, the CSR-
type firm’s objective function can be translated into a parameterised 
combination of profits and consumer’s surplus.  
It follows that the objective function of the manufacturer firm (WM) is 
12 
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2
2 qkqvckCSW MM   ,         (6) 
 
where k 0  is the weight the manufacturer firm assigns to consumer surplus. 
On the other hand, the objective function of the retailer firm (WR) is 
2
)(
2q
rqcqwqarCSW RR   ,       (7) 
 
where r 0 is the weight the retailer firm assigns to consumer surplus.12 
The game is structured as a three-stage game. At stage three, as usual, the 
retailer chooses output having a CSR objective. At stage two, the manufacturer 
fixes the input price. Then, at stage one, owners of manufacturer and retailer 
firms decide non-cooperatively the weight of consumer surplus for the 
objective function, maximizing their own profits, according to three different 
sequence of moves: i) M->R: the manufacturer chooses k prior to the choice of 
r by retailer; ii) M&R: the manufacturer and the retailer simultaneously choose 
k and r; iii) R->M: the retailer chooses r prior to the manufacturer’s choice of k.  
As usual, the game is solved by backward induction. The sequence of moves for 
this game is illustrated in Figure 1.  
At the third stage, the maximization of the retailer firm objective function in (7) 
leads to the following output function 
 
                                                          
12 It is easy to see that, for k =r= 0, each firm operates as a profit-maximizing firm while, for 
k=r =1, the whole consumer surplus is considered in the firm’s objective function. 
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Fig. 1. Sequence of moves 
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
)1(2
),(              (8) 
 
At the second stage, after substitution of (8) in (6), the manufacturer 
maximizes its objective function (6) with respect to c, which straightforwardly 
leads to the input as a function of the CSR parameters: 
2
2)12(2
),(
rkv
rkc

 .         (9) 
 
Substituting (9) in (8), we obtain the final quantity as function of the CSR 
parameters: 
Owners of manufacturer 
and retailer firms decide 
non-cooperatively the 
weights k and r, 
respectively  
M->R: manufacturer 
chooses k prior to the 
choice of r by retailer 
M&R: manufacturer and 
retailer choose 
simultaneously k and r 
R->M: retailer chooses r 
prior to the choice of k by 
manufacturer 
The manufacturer  
chooses the input price 
maximizing its CSR 
objective function  
The retailer chooses 
output q to  maximize 
its CSR objective 
function 
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 
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Substituting backwards (9) and (10) we obtain both firms’ profits as function of 
only CSR parameters: 
 
 2
2
)1(28
)(2)1(2
),(
rkv
warkv
rkM


     (11) 
 
 2
2
)1(28
)(32)1(4
),(
rkv
warkv
rkR


     (12) 
 
We now address the stage of the decision on the CSR parameters. Let us begin 
with the case MR. Under this sequence, the manufacturer decides whether 
and how introduce the CSR parameter prior to the corresponding retailer’s 
decision. The solutions of this stage are given by the following Lemmas. 
 
Lemma 1. The retailer sets a CSR parameter at the level r=r°, whose values 
depend on the future choice of the k level by manufacturer . 
 
Proof: it is easy to see that  
 
 
  3
)1(2
0
)1(28
)()1(23
3
2 kv
rr
rkv
wavkr
r
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R 
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





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




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Lemma 2. The manufacturer, taking into account the decision of the retailer on 
r=r°, chooses to remain a profit-seeking firm (i.e., k=0).  
 
Proof: it is easy to see that   
 
 
2
3
3(5 2(1 ) ( )
0, 0
32 2(1 )
M
M R
k v a w
k
k k v


  
   
  
.  
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Under the sequence M&R, both firms’ owners decide independently and 
simultaneously on their CSR parameters, leading to the following Lemmas. 
 
Lemma 3. Only the retailer decides a positive engagement in CSR activities 
setting r=r*.  
 
Proof: this straightforwardly derives by observing each derivative of profits 
with respect to the own CSR parameter: 
 
 
2
3
&
( )
0, 0
4 2(1 )
M
M R
k a w
k
k v k r
 
   
   
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&
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








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Therefore, the retailer, given the manufacturer’s choice of remaining profit-
seeking (k=0), selects the optimal (profit-maximizing) CSR parameter at the 
level   
3
)1(2
*
v
rr




.      (13) 
 
Remark: By inspection of (13), we observe that the retailer always chooses to 
take into account in its objective at least two-third of the consumer surplus; 
because this weight increases with the marginal cost of input production, it 
follows that, when the latter is sufficiently high, even a weight of the consumer 
surplus larger than the unity (and then, than own profits) may be optimal for 
the selfish retailer.  
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Finally, under the sequence RM, the retailer decides whether and how 
introduce the CSR parameter prior to the corresponding manufacturer’s 
decision. Under this sequence, the following holds. 
 
Lemma 4. The manufacturer does never engage in CSR activities.  
 
Proof: it is easy to see that    
 
2
3
( )
0, 0
4 2(1 )
M
R M
k a w
k
k v k r


 
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.   
 
Lemma 5. The retailer, embodying the decision of the manufacturer of not 
being of CSR-type (i.e., k=0), decides a positive engagement in CSR activities 
setting r=r*.  
 
Proof: it is easy to see that   
 
 
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From Lemma 1-5, the following Corollary holds. 
 
Corollary 1. Regardless of the timing of moves as regards the choice of the CSR 
parameter, the retailer always chooses the some level of CSR, while the 
manufacturer always choses to remain profit-seeking. 
  
Corollary 1 clearly shows the changes with respect to Brand and Grothe’s 
(2015) results: CSR is adopted only by one firm for whatever timing of moves, 
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while in Brand and Grothe (2015) is adopted by both firms but only if the timing 
of moves is MR.  
Substituting the retailer’s CSR parameter positive value r* in (9), and taking into 
account for the choice of being only profit-seeking by the manufacturer, that is 
k=0, we obtain the equilibrium wholesale price *c : 
2 5
*
3
v
c

         (14) 
 
Substitution of r*, k=0, and the equilibrium wholesale price *c  into the 
expressions (10), (11) and (12) yields the equilibrium quantity, each firm’s 
profits and total channel profits ():  
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Moreover, it is also straightforward to provide the expressions for the 
consumer surplus and total welfare: 
2
2
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To compare the classical bilateral monopoly in which both firms are purely  
profit-maximizing and a bilateral monopoly in which a socially concerned 
retailer endogenously emerges (while the manufacturer remains profit-
maximizing), we report the equilibrium outcomes of the former case13:  
vc 21         (21) 
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Lemma 6. The manufacturer always charges a lower input price when the 
retailer is social concerned.  
 
Proof: by simple comparison of (14) and (21). 
 
The choice of the manufacturer of not being engaged in CSR activities is 
intuitive. Given the decreasing returns technology, every additional unit of 
output produced is increasingly costly. Therefore, the manufacturer has not 
                                                          
13 Those outcomes are straightforwardly obtained considering that, if  both firms are purely  
profit-maximizing, then  k=r=0 in Eqs. (9)-(12). 
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any incentive in further expanding production taking into account the 
consumers’ welfare into its objective. On the other hand, the retailer 
strategically adopts CSR behaviors to obtain a lower input price from the 
manufacturer (see also eq. (9)). The selection of a positive level of “consumers’ 
friendly” CSR activities leads to an output expansion which has several effects 
both on the revenues and costs side of the retailer. In fact, on the one hand, an 
increase in output has a positive effect on revenues; however, it decreases the 
price for final consumers, with a negative impact on revenues. On the other 
hand, more products for the final consumers directly increase the retailer’s 
total cost; however, the strategic choice of engaging in CSR reduces the 
manufacturer’s wholesale price of the intermediate input (which has the 
highest incidence on the retailer’s total costs). As a consequence, for the 
retailer the combined effect of the output expansion and the input price 
reduction overweighs the effect of the output price reduction, and for the 
manufacturer the output expansion effect overweighs the price reduction 
effect, leading to the following results.  
 
Result 1. When the endogenous choice whether to be of CSR-type is allowed in 
the supply chain, the emergence of downstream firms' concern over CSR  
realizes an enhancement of profits of each firm, industry profit, consumer 
surplus and social welfare as a whole.  
 
Proof: by simple comparison of Eqs. (16- 20) and (23-27).  
 
Corollary 2. i) Although the downstream firm's CSR concern brings upon a 
profits increase in both firms, the profits’ enhancement of the CSR retailer firm 
is twice than that of the profit-seeking manufacturer firm; ii) while in the 
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standard profit-seeking context the manufacturer’s profits are twice those of 
the retailer, under the retailer’s endogenous choice of CSR the profitability 
ranking  is exactly reversed. 
  
Therefore, we note that, in a vertical industry with a convex technology, the 
choice of being CSR-engaged results in a device in the hand of the retailer to 
redistribute profits inside the channel with respect to the supplier, however 
not at the expenses of the latter, which also benefits from the retailer’s social 
responsibility, as does the total value of the channel as well as the welfare of 
consumers and society.   
 
Corollary 3. The downstream firm's social responsibility not only brings upon a 
higher profit for its owners but also leads to a Pareto-superior outcome. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper investigates a standard bilateral monopoly in which a manufacturer 
sells an intermediate product to the retailer, which in turn offers the final 
product to end-consumers, allowing for an endogenous strategic choice of  the 
level of care about the consumer surplus (consumers’ friendly CSR) by the 
firms’ owners, assuming decreasing return to the input provided by the 
manufacturer to the retailer. In other words, we revisit the results of Brand and 
Grothe (2015) who assume a linear bilateral monopoly, and we reveal different 
findings which can be resumed as follows: 1) the achievement of a higher profit 
for owners of all firms at the equilibrium, as the motivation behind the 
presence of social concerns in the firms’ behaviors, is also extended to a 
vertical industry with decreasing returns to input; 2) it is optimal for the 
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downstream firm - but not for the upstream firm - to be of CSR-type and 
strongly engaged towards the welfare of consumers (even being sensitive to it 
more than to own profits), and this holds for whatever timing of moves with 
respect to the choice of CSR, reversing the Brand and Grothe’s (2015) finding; 
3) not only the retailer’s profits but also the profit-seeking manufacturer firm’s 
profits benefit from the consumers’ friendly CSR activities of its retailer and 
thus this situation constitutes a Pareto-superior outcome; 4) this result may 
explain real world cases in which in a supply chain only the retailer is engaged 
in CSR activities; 5) this offers a policy warning about whether either retailers 
or manufacturers should be more  stimulated for engaging in CSR, depending 
on the prevailing technology (i.e. returns to scale) in the industry; 6) since we 
have shown that the choice of being CSR-engaged becomes a device in the 
hand of the retailer to redistribute profits inside the marketing channel then, in 
a vertical industry with a convex technology, the empirical implication is that it 
should more often detected a presence of CSR in the downstream rather than 
in the upstream firm as well as a higher profitability of the retailer than that of 
the manufacturer when the former engages in CSR activities; 7) the purely 
selfish owners’ behavior of the downstream component of a bilateral 
monopoly leads to the achievement of a Pareto-improvement. This is another 
novel example showing the reconciliation between the achievement of social 
objectives and the sole firm’s behaviour admitted by the traditional approach 
of economics – according to the Friedman (1970)’s opinion - that is, the 
maximization of profits to the shareholders. In conclusion, our paper sheds new 
light on whether and how firms in a marketing channel may endogenously 
choose to be socially concerned under a realistic technology.  
As future research agenda, those findings call for an extra robustness check 
under different model specifications, relaxing the assumptions of this paper. 
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First, it would be interesting to introduce network externalities to verify the 
survival of the current results. Moreover, other hypotheses such as the 
presence of managerial delegation and endogenous costs  (such as the 
presence of unionised labor) within the marketing channel, either only in the 
upstream/downstream company or in all the channel, are extremely intriguing 
to be  studied.  
  
References  
Aupperle, K.E., Carroll, A.B., Hatfield, J.D., 1985. An empirical examination of 
the relationship between corporate social responsibility and 
profitability. Academy of Management Journal 28(2), 446-463. 
Baron, D.P., 2001. Private politics, corporate social responsibility, and 
integrated strategy. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 
7–45. 
Benabou, R., Tirole, J., 2010. Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility. 
Economica 77, 1-19. 
Bils, M., 1987. The Cyclical Behavior of Marginal Cost and Price. The American 
Economic Review  77(5), 838-855. 
Brand B., Grothe M., 2013.  A note on ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Marketing Channel Coordination’. Research in Economics 67, 324–327. 
Brand, B., Grothe, M., 2015. Social Responsibility in a Bilateral Monopoly. 
Journal of  Economics  115, 275–289. 
Bromiley, P., Marcus, A., 1989. The deterrent to dubious corporate behavior: 
Profitability, probability and safety recalls.  Strategic Management 
Journal 10(3), 233-250. 
23 
 
Chen, C.L., Liu, Q., Li, J., Wang,  L.F.S., 2016. Corporate social responsibility and 
downstream price competition with retailer's effort. International 
Review of Economics and Finance 46, 36–54. 
Davidson, W.N., Chandy, P.R., Cross, M., 1987. Large losses, risk management 
and stock returns in the airline industry. The Journal of Risk and 
Insurance 54(1), 162-172. 
Davidson, W.N., Worrel, D.L., 1988. The impact of announcements of corporate 
illegalities on shareholder returns. Academy of Management 
Journal 31(1), 195-200. 
Doni, N., Ricchiuti  G., 2013. Market equilibrium in the presence of green 
consumers and responsible firms: A comparative statics analysis. 
Resource and Energy Economics 35, 380–395. 
Fanti, L., Buccella, D., 2017a. The effects of Corporate Social Responsibility on 
entry. Economia e Politica Industriale - Journal of Industrial and Business 
Economics 44(2), 259-267. 
Fanti, L., Buccella, D., 2017b. Corporate Social Responsibility in a game 
theoretic context. Economia e Politica Industriale - Journal of Industrial 
and Business Economics 34(3), 471–489. 
Fanti, L., Buccella, D., 2017c. Corporate social responsibility, profits and welfare 
with managerial firms. International Review of Economics 64(4), 341-356. 
Fanti, L., Buccella, D., 2017d. Profitability of Corporate Social Responsibility in 
network industries. Department of Economics and Management, 
University of Pisa, Discussion Paper 2017/216. 
Fernández‐Kranz, D., Santaló, J., 2010. When necessity becomes a virtue: The 
effect of product market competition on corporate social 
responsibility. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 19(2), 453-
487. 
24 
 
Friedman, M., 1970. The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its 
Profits, New York Times Magazine, September. 
Garriga, E., Melè, D., 2004. Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping 
the Territory. Journal of Business Ethics 53, 51–71, 2004. 
Goering, G.E., 2007. The strategic use of managerial incentives in a non-profit 
firm mixed duopoly. Managerial and Decision Economics 28, 83–91. 
Goering, G. E., 2008. Welfare impacts of a non-profit firm in mixed commercial 
markets. Economic Systems 32, 326–334. 
Goering, G.E., 2012. Corporate social responsibility and marketing channel 
coordination. Research in Economics 66(2), 142–148.  
Goering, G.E., 2014. The profit-maximizing case for corporate social 
responsibility in a bilateral  monopoly. Managerial and Decision 
Economics 35, 493–499 
Griffin, J.J., Mahon, J.F., 1997. The corporate social performance and corporate 
financial performance debate twenty-five years of incomparable 
research. Business & Society 36(1), 5-31 
Ingram, R.W., Frazier, K.B., 1983. Narrative disclosures in annual 
reports. Journal of Business Research 11(1), 49-60. 
Kopel, M (2009) Strategic CSR, spillovers, and first-mover advantage. SSRN. 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1408632 
Kopel, M., Brand, B., 2012. Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of 
strategic incentives. Economic Modelling 29(3), 982–989.  
Kopel, M., Brand, B., 2013. Why Do Socially Concerned Firms Provide Low-
Powered Incentives to their Managers? SSRN Working Paper. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2269192 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/s
srn.2269192 
25 
 
KPMG, 2005. KPMG International Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Reporting 2005. Available online at 
https://commdev.org/userfiles/files/1274_file_D2.pdf 
KPMG, 2015. Currents of Change: KPMG Survey of Corporate responsibility 
reporting 2015. Available online at 
http://www.kpmg.com/cn/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/pag
es/kpmg-survey-of-corporate-responsibility-reporting-2015-o-
201511.aspx 
Hino, Y., Zennyo Y., 2017, Corporate social responsibility and strategic 
relationships. International Review of Economics 64(3), 231-244.  
Heywood, J. S., McGinty, M., 2007. Convex costs and the merger paradox 
revisited. Economic Inquiry 45, 342_349. 
Lambertini, L., Tampieri, A., 2012. Corporate social responsibility and firms 
ability to collude. In: Boubaker, S., Nguyen, D.K. (Eds.), Board Directors 
and Corporate Social Responsibility. Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan UK.  
Lambertini L., Tampieri A., 2015. Incentives, performance and desirability of 
socially responsible firms in a Cournot oligopoly. Economic Modelling 50, 
40–48.  
Lambertini, L., Palestini, A., Tampieri, A., 2016. CSR in an asymmetric duopoly 
with environmental externality. Southern Economic Journal 83, 236–252. 
Planer-Friedrich, L., Sahm M., 2016. Why firms should care for all consumers, 
BERG Working Paper Series, No. 116, ISBN 978-3-943153-35-4.  
Reinhardt, F.L., Stavins, R.N., Vietor, R.H.K., 2008. Corporate social 
responsibility through an economic lens. Review of Environmental 
Economics and Policy 2, 219–239. 
26 
 
Roman, R.M., Hayibor, S. Agle, B.R., 1999. The relationship between social and 
financial performance repainting a portrait. Business & Society 38(1), 
109-125. 
Schramm-Klein H., Dirk Morschett, D., Swoboda, B., 2015. Retailer corporate 
social responsibility: Shedding light on CSR’s impact on profit  of 
intermediaries in marketing channels. International Journal of Retail & 
Distribution Management 43(4-5), 403-431.  
Siegel, D.S., Vitaliano, D.F., 2007. An empirical analysis of the strategic use of 
corporate social responsibility. Journal of Economics and Management 
Strategy 16(3), 773–792.  
Spengler, J.J., 1950. Vertical integration and antitrust policy. Journal of Political 
Economy 58(4), 347–352. 
Waddock, S.A., Graves, S.B., 1997. The corporate social performance-financial 
performance link. Strategic Management Journal 18(4), 303-319. 
Wirl, F., 2015. Downstream and upstream oligopolies when retailer's effort 
matters. Journal of Economics 116, 99–127.  
